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Abstract 
Radical innovation in professional settings faces an institutional challenge. Professionals enjoy 
autonomy predicated on jurisdictional knowledge and can resist radical innovation if their interests 
are threatened. Our study examines if and how managers mediate professional resistance and ensure 
that radical innovation can take hold.  
A comparative case study of 12 Italian hospitals introducing integrated service configurations 
shows that managers may hold back from introducing radical innovation where they judge 
professional resistance as insurmountable. Executives reinforce, rather than challenge, the status 
quo, and discourage middle managers from further actions. Where the professional context is more 
receptive because of micro-institutional affordances, then, managers enact different tactics. 
Managers may centralize decision-making through political work, which however increases 
professional resistance and hinder radical innovation. Managers may adopt project management 
approaches, which facilitate local experiments, but struggle to scale-up the radical innovation. Most 
successful cases are characterized by executive and middle managers enacting a two-step 
institutional work, which reconfigures the regulative, normative and cognitive foundations of 
professional boundaries and practice.  
The comparative study shows how managers can support radical innovation in collaboration with 
professionals. In the two-step institutional work, executive and middle managers develop stable 
alliances with local professional groups to provide cognitive/normative foundations of radical 
innovation; second, they allow professionals to inhabit nascent institutional arrangements to make 
sense of how these fit with their prevailing interests, norms, and beliefs; third, they co-develop new 
structures/rules that encourage professionals to pursue radical innovation; finally, they perform 
maintenance work to preserve professionals’ attachment to new institutions. 
 
Practitioner points 
 In professional contexts, radical innovation requires changes to the regulative, normative and 
cognitive foundations of practice 
 Radical innovation is enabled by gradual strategies of institutional work, in which professionals are 
given time to inhabit and experiment with new practices and boundaries 
 Radical innovation is enabled by a coalition of executives, middle managers and professionals, who 
enact distinct types of institutional work 
 
 1 
The Role of Managers in Enacting Two-Step Institutional Work for Radical Innovation 
in Professional Organizations 
Introduction 
Studies of innovation highlight the role of managers: they outline the strategic intent of 
innovation, facilitate adoption of new practices, grant autonomy to frontline employees to 
pursue radical innovation, and design appropriate incentives to stimulate creativity 
(O’Connor and DeMartino, 2006; Hidalgo and Albors, 2008; Poskela and Martinsuo, 2009).  
However, in professional organizations, the role of managers in developing and 
implementing innovation differs (Von Nordenflycht, 2010) since frontline employees are 
professionals that possess expert knowledge that is heavily regulated and inaccessible to 
managers. As a consequence, it is frontline professionals, not managers, that control the 
design and implementation of radical innovation. They may do so in a way that proves 
undesirable for managers. For example, because radical innovation may undermine 
professional boundaries and change longstanding professional practice, frontline 
professionals may actively work to preserve the status quo (Barczak et al., 2006; O’Connor 
and DeMartino, 2006; Hoegl et al., 2007; Glynn et al., 2010),. Under such conditions, 
managers may  ‘only’ be supporting actors, who facilitate professional decision-making 
(Currie and Procter, 2005; Llewellyn, 2001), or they avoid engaging professionals with 
anything more than incremental innovation (Fitzgerald et al., 2002; Vermeulen et al., 2007; 
Lewin and Reeves, 2011; Currie et al., 2012). Addressing this challenge, our study reveals 
how managers engage and shape the efforts of highly-expert and autonomous professionals 
towards radical innovation.  
Theoretically, the challenge for managers in introducing radical innovation is an 
institutional one. Professionals defend established boundaries and practices by reinforcing the 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive arrangements in their organizations; i.e. the 
established rules, social expectations and logics of actions. In professional contexts, these 
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three arrangements consolidate into ‘institutional pillars’ (Scott, 2001) and produce 
stabilizing effects towards replication and reinforcement, rather than revision, of established 
professional boundaries and practices (Suddaby and Viale, 2011; Muzio et al., 2015). To 
realize radical innovation in professional organizations then, managers must act upon 
institutional pillars.  
Extant literature tends to emphasize the top-down effect of institutional pillars upon 
innovation (e.g., Van Dijk et al., 2011; Yang and Wang, 2013; Shu et al., 2015). In contrast, 
our study draws upon the concept of ‘institutional work’: “the purposive action of individuals 
and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting [regulative, normative and 
cognitive foundations of] institutions” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; p. 216). Through 
focusing upon institutional work, the study asks: how do managers act upon institutional 
pillars through institutional work to influence professional organization towards radical 
innovation? 
To address this research question empirically, a comparative case study of radical 
innovation in 12 Italian hospitals was enacted to examine the interaction of executive and 
middle managers with elite, high-status professionals (i.e., doctors) in the introduction of 
radically new integrated service reconfiguration. This dilutes professional boundaries and 
changes longstanding professional practice, and so exemplifies our theoretical concerns 
through impacting regulative, normative and cognitive institutional pillars.   
This article proceeds as follows. Within the literature review, the institutional perspective 
is detailed by focusing on both the structures and possibilities for agency. Then, a description 
of the research setting and design is presented. Data are shown by clustering the empirical 
cases: management holding back from radical innovation (cluster 1); management organizing 
for innovation through centralized projects (cluster 2); management organizing for innovation 
through political work (cluster 3); management organizing for innovation through two-step 
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institutional work (cluster 4). Within the discussion, a comparative analysis is presented. 
Finally, in conclusion, the theoretical contribution to understanding managers’ role in radical 
innovation within professional organizations is emphasized, practical implications outlined, 
and further research suggested.      
An institutional perspective on radical innovation in professional organizations 
Institutional theory conceives professional organizations as characterized by three 
institutional ‘pillars’ (Scott, 2001), which cause actors to shy away from radical innovation. 
Regulative elements establish rules to which actors should conform; normative elements 
introduce a prescriptive and evaluative dimension in social life, representing how actors 
should behave appropriately; and cultural-cognitive elements relate to shared conceptions of 
what constitutes the social reality, and how actors should evaluate behaviors. These pillars 
produce stabilizing effects in the organization, aligning the behaviors of embedded actors 
towards the replication of enduring social structures and systems, thus engendering 
isomorphism and path dependence. Radical innovation emerges only when the stabilizing 
effects of institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs are breached.  
These breaches are defined ‘micro-institutional affordances’, from which organizational 
actors become more aware and tolerant of radical changes (Van Dijk et al., 2011). Three 
phenomena are likely to generate breaches. First, increase in multiplicity of institutionalized 
interests, norms and beliefs co-existing in the organization, raises actors’ awareness of a need 
for change (Reay and Hinings, 2009). Second, heterogeneity of organizational groups with 
distinct interests, norms and beliefs raises actors’ awareness that radical change might 
appease stakeholders’ demands (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2011). Third, ambiguity of 
institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs, raises actors’ awareness that a radical change 
could help restore clarity (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). Micro-institutional affordances hence 
represent situations in which compliance to established rules and social norms, as well as the 
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commitment to established values, interests and belief systems, is challenged, either because 
their interpretation is more ambiguous or because new interests, norms and beliefs become 
more relevant. So, embedded actors are more tolerant of, and predisposed towards, radical 
change (Lawrence et al., 2013). 
To take advantage of micro-institutional affordances, actors can engage in institutional 
work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Institutional work can maintain, create or disrupt an 
institutional arrangement and is classified according to whether it targets the regulative, 
normative or cultural-cognitive pillar. Institutional work is political work if it 
maintains/modifies rules, structures and property rights that define access to financial and 
other material resources; technical work if it maintains/modifies beliefs around what is 
considered appropriate behavior; cultural work if it maintains/modifies actors’ attachment to 
institutions. Table 1 provides a summary of key forms of political, technical and cultural 
work enacted to support radical innovation (see columns 1 and 2). 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
Previous research in professional organizations, focused upon the interaction of 
professionals and managers, highlights that each actor, often in opposition, enact institutional 
work to maintain or revise established boundaries and practices. In institutional terms, 
boundaries represent demarcations between the jurisdictions of different actors, within which 
they can self-regulate; practices represent shared routines that inform actors’ responses to 
specific situations (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2011).  
Professionals usually have the upper hand in relation to managers because they possess 
expert knowledge required to develop and deliver products/services and accordingly have 
autonomy to choose when and how to engage with radical innovation (Abbott, 1988). Their 
institutional work defends this right and shapes the nature and extent of radical innovation 
(Suddaby and Viale, 2011; Currie et al., 2012). Professionals’ institutional work revolves 
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around shaping inter-professional boundaries that establish how professionals are connected 
and practices that establish what professionals should do in their jobs (Ackroyd and Muzio, 
2007). Boundaries and practices are connected in a recursive relation: boundaries delimit the 
sets of practices that embedded actors pursue, while practices support specific boundary 
arrangements (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010). Accordingly, professionals neutralize the 
‘threat’ of radical innovation by reinforcing boundaries and thus protecting their self-
regulation and exclusive jurisdiction (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Suddaby and Viale, 
2011). In operating “boundary maintenance around the differential areas of expertise 
associated with their work” (Llewellyn, 2001, p. 595), professionals perform technical work 
and cultural work to reinforce the normative/cognitive foundations of their claims (Micelotta 
and Washington, 2013).  
Executive managers may attempt to enact institutional work such as: ‘undermining the 
moral foundations’ of professionals’ autonomy; ‘theorizing’ cause-effect chains related to 
performance management and measurement systems; developing rules systems that change 
the status of marginalized organizational actors or create hierarchies (‘defining’); diverting 
resources and property rights across professional groups (‘vesting’); introducing auditing and 
monitoring mechanisms (‘policing’) (See Table 1). These attempts, however, all struggle to 
produce change without support from professionals (Suddaby and Viale, 2011; Currie et al., 
2012; Muzio et al., 2013). 
Meanwhile, middle managers face an even bleaker outlook regarding their role in radical 
innovation, with little evidence that they can successfully enact institutional work. Generalist 
(without a professional background) middle managers are not commonly characterized as 
institutional actors that drive radical change in professional organizations. Their role is one of 
a supporting cast confined to facilitating strategic change or innovation within established 
institutional pillars (Wooldridge et al., 2008). Thus, how executive managers and generalist 
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middle managers contribute to challenging institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs of 
professionals is unclear, as attempts to introduce radical innovation unfold. Following which, 
to repeat our research question: how do managers act upon institutional pillars through 
institutional work to influence professional organization towards radical innovation? 
Research Design  
The Empirical Case 
The study investigated the attempts of executive and middle managers in 12 Italian hospitals 
to enable the creation of radically new services for complex care patients. The choice of the 
empirical setting, Italian hospitals, is shaped by our theoretical concerns. Hospitals have long 
been privileged contexts to induce theory about change and innovation in professional 
contexts from an institutional perspective. Specifically, institutional accounts of change 
within hospitals highlights the significance of their underpinning institutional pillars, which 
renders maintenance of the status quo more likely than radical innovation taking hold (Reay 
et al., 2006; Currie et al., 2012). This empirical setting thus represents an extreme context 
from which to induce theory.  
The radical innovation under investigation involved service integration. Complex care 
patients have multiple chronic diseases, which require long-term interventions, and access to 
different clinical departments. Stroke patients, for instance, access neurology, radiology, 
accident and emergency, physiotherapy, and nutrition departments during their treatment and 
follow-up. They typically encounter separate and disjointed services, since each clinical 
department implements a specialist, but compartmentalized approach. To allow better 
continuity of care, managers wanted clinical departments to create integrated services, which 
unite previously separate specialist services. Thus, they encouraged the development of 
multidisciplinary teams comprising leading doctors across different departments, to generate 
a single point-of-access service for patients with specific symptoms, agreeing on new 
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evidence-based criteria for patient referral and interventions, and defining new rules for 
discharge, referral, waiting lists and resource access. 
As an intermediate step, managers sought to establish the use of Integrated Care Pathway 
(ICP) methodologies by clinical departments to stimulate and inform the radical redesign of 
their services. An ICP is a structured multidisciplinary plan of care that translates scientific 
discoveries, guidelines and evidence into new services, aiming to standardize care for a 
defined group of patients (Kinsman et al., 2010). The adoption of ICPs was not the radical 
innovation, but a methodology that hospital managers thought clinical departments could use 
to design new services for patients with complex care needs. ICP methods informed the 
creation of new care services in ‘markets’ where comparable services did not exist, and the 
redesign of radically new services, which required significant changes in decision-making 
criteria, integration of different clinical departments, and management of patient flow 
(Kinsman et al., 2010). This is consistent with the definition of radical innovation as “the 
development or application of significantly new technologies or ideas [that] are either non-
existent or require dramatic behavior changes” (McDermott and Colarelli, 2002; p. 424).  
The multidisciplinary teams within and across hospitals redesigned different services with 
an ICP methodology. In the most successful case in the dataset (i.e. Cicero), different 
multidisciplinary teams redesigned multiple cancer-related, cardiology, gastroenterology, 
ophthalmic, and neurological services. Each innovation mobilized different groups of 
clinicians and an evidence base, and generated different outcomes. Another hospital (i.e. 
Sloan) took a more focused approach and experimented with new services in relation to very 
rare neurological diseases. More generally, hospitals could not adopt others’ redesigns, as 
they were unavailable at the time of their innovation efforts; hence, they engaged in the 
whole process of idea generation and implementation in isolation from each other. 
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Three key actors were engaged with this radical innovation. First, executive managers 
enacted a strategic role to stimulate the creation of new services, and the integration of 
previously compartmentalized services. They were generalist managers, as they lacked 
medical expertise. Second, they were supported on the ground by generalist middle managers 
in the Quality Departments, reporting into executive managers, and who lacked hierarchical 
power over clinical departments. They also lacked medical expertise. Finally, based upon 
their jurisdictional knowledge, doctors controlled the creation and implementation of 
services. Several doctors involved were heads of clinical departments, hence combining 
clinical and managerial responsibilities they acted as ‘hybrid middle managers’ (Llewellyn, 
2001), exerting hierarchical power over nurses, junior doctors and other clinicians.  
When radical, the ICP-based service redesigns required major revisions to institutionalized 
interests, norms and beliefs related to boundaries and practices enacted by doctors within 
clinical departments. First, they challenged clinical specialism and doctors’ capacity to 
develop individualized care packages for patients (Adler and Kwon, 2013), by standardizing 
care processes and therapy and diagnosis criteria. Second, they challenged institutionalized 
reliance on tacit ‘mindlines’ derived from early training and socialization, where doctors 
draw on experiential or more intuitive knowledge in diagnosing and managing patients 
(Gabbay and LeMay, 2004). Now decision-making was based on more formal clinical 
evidence. Finally, they reshaped inter-professional boundaries, requiring experts with 
different roles and backgrounds to interact in multidisciplinary teams, disclosing their 
knowledge to others, sharing decision-making, so conceding a portion of their autonomy to 
peers (Lewin and Reeves, 2011).  
Data Gathering 
Data was collected from October 2011 to September 2012 across 12 comparative cases. 
Initially, within the Italian healthcare context, exploratory interviews were undertaken with 
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managers in 20 hospitals, identified as high-performing organizations through publicly 
available ‘league tables’ of quality of their services. Then, hospitals with comparable quality 
were selected, as variations in this indicator could introduce confounding explanations in our 
study. In this exploratory stage, within some identifiably high-performing hospitals, 
managers knew little about integrated service, nor had they any thoughts about its 
implementation, so these hospitals were excluded from further analysis. Thus 12 high-
performing hospitals were identified that were active with plans for integrated services, but 
not necessarily committed to their implementation in the short-term. Some reported system-
wide integrated care, while at the other end others reported they were not progressing 
integrated services in the face of potential resistance. Such varied responses aligned with our 
concern to explain managers’ institutional work in seeking to drive reform.  
Across the 12 hospitals, a comparative case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) was taken 
to examine the (re)design of complex care services according to principles of integrated care. 
A substantial archive of documents around the redesign of frontline services and ICP 
application was initially gathered. These documents provided evidence on the extent of 
service redesign, criteria to assess clinical outcomes, and degree of implementation. 
Documents relating to organizational strategies and policies for ICPs were collected along 
with scientific articles in national and international journals, reports on ICP development, ICP 
presentations for internal meetings, workshops or conferences, newsletters and leaflets on 
hospital intranet or websites. These documents were subjected to data analysis along with 
interview transcripts. 
As the documentary analysis was insufficient to detail how ICPs were developed and 
implemented, interviews with key informants became the primary source of data. General 
middle managers in quality departments were first approached, as they were responsible in 
each of the empirical cases for supporting service redesign through ICPs, to deepen access to 
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the 12 in-depth cases. Following this, the main actors involved in the innovation process were 
identified and interviewed; i.e., executive managers (CEOs, Medical Directors, R&D 
Directors), general middle managers in the Quality Departments, and doctors.  
The interviews took place in two phases, across the first six sites, and then followed later 
with interviews in a second group of six sites. One of the researchers undertaking interviews, 
asked about actions stimulating service redesign, the key interactions between actors as 
service was redesigned, and perceived factors affecting radical innovation. Following 
Mantere’s (2008) approach, interviews were semi-structured to allow a “story-telling 
approach that is, to let the interviewees describe their views as freely as possible, allowing 
them to interpret the questions freely and pursue those themes that they regarded as central” 
(p. 298). In total, 60 informants in 12 hospitals were interviewed, on average for one hour. 
Supplementary field notes kept track of in-field observations, such as interactions between 
managers and doctors in departmental meetings (50 hours of observation). Table 2 provides 
an overview of the research phases, hospitals involved and research instruments for the 
various activities. 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
In the analysis, one of the researchers (conducting the fieldwork) initially coded data, while 
others acted as external investigators, developing theory ‘from outside’ through independent 
within-case and cross-case analyses, to reach a common theoretical understanding of 
institutional work enacted around radical innovation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mantere, 2008). 
Triangulation across analysts was performed to identify clusters of cases, as only one of the 
four authors had been involved in data collection, hence the remaining authors were able to 
challenge and interrogate derivation of clusters by the fieldworker (Mantere et al., 2012).  
In outline, in successive stages of analysis, the intention was to move from a descriptive, 
empirical to an interpretive, more theoretical mode of explanation for the patterns of 
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innovation induced across the comparative case data. The final step of the analysis involved 
categorization of the broader explanatory categories that were more empirically oriented into 
aggregated theoretical categories (types of institutional work and by whom), with 
consideration for how they linked to each other; e.g. how different actors’ institutional work, 
when considered together, produced (or did not produce) a radical innovation effect (Pratt et 
al., 2006).  
Following such analysis, the authors agreed to group the 12 cases in four clusters: (i) no 
management initiative: 4 cases where managers disengaged from radical innovation due to 
professional resistance; (ii) organizing for radical innovation through a centralized project: 4 
cases where managers coordinated service redesign through the adoption of a standardized 
ICP format and the supervision of project teamwork; (iii) organizing for radical innovation 
through political work: 2 cases where managers carried out ‘political work’ aimed at 
introducing new regulations and incentives; (iv) organizing for radical innovation through 
cross-level institutional work: 2 cases where early adopters and managers carried out 
‘technical work’, ‘cultural work’ and ‘political work’ to stimulate service redesign. In each 
cluster, cases were compared to identify common patterns, elucidating a general explanatory 
model and delineating differences regarding how specific factors triggered diverse outcomes. 
To assess the degree of ‘success’ in each cluster, the number of ‘original’ service redesigns 
informed by ICPs and the number of departments involved (to measure the extent of changes) 
were considered, along with the perceived radicalness of the ICPs and the degree of their 
implementation in practice (both informed by clinical informants). The cases ranged from (i) 
cases of zero radical service redesign attempted, with no instance of ICP adoption (i.e. 
Black), to one case of more than 30 service redesigns informed by ICPs, whose degree of 
implementation was confirmed by the institutionalization of new structures (i.e. Cicero). This 
analysis provided a general model explaining how variations in organizing radical innovation 
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through ICPs related to the roles and institutional work of executive managers, middle 
managers and professionals, which is outlined in Figure 1.  
Findings 
Table 1, column 3 highlights examples of institutional work enacted in the selected cases by 
managers. Further detail about managers’ institutional work is provided below. The 
combination of different institutional arrangements and institutional work led to specific 
outcomes for each cluster. Terms in italics within empirical sections refer to forms of 
institutional work enacted in the cases. Table 3 provides a summary of institutional work 
within each cluster. In Cluster 1 cases (column 2, Table 3), institutionalized interests, norms 
and values worked against radical service redesign, the latter which was generally perceived 
as a low priority or clinically inappropriate. There was little evidence of institutional work 
enacted by managers. More institutional work was enacted by professionals for maintenance 
purposes around institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs. Quality managers who held an 
interest in ICPs felt “between a hammer and the anvil” (Black, Quality Manager). ICP 
development was then left to the spontaneous efforts of professionals and remained sporadic. 
The limited involvement of executive managers is a sore point for us. We cannot get ICPs into 
their heads no matter how we try. For them, ICPs are not a priority and the time is not right 
to put the delicate equilibrium between clinical departments at risk. So, ICPs depend on 
doctors, who tend their own garden (Winter, Quality Manager). 
Since managers’ institutional work was absent in Cluster 1, the empirical presentation will 
focus in the following sections upon case Clusters 2, 3 and 4, with particular detail provided 
about our exemplar Cluster 4 cases.   
Cluster 2: Organizing for radical innovation through a centralized project 
The Cluster 2 cases were also characterized by institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs 
preserving compartmentalized services and imbuing skepticism towards standardized care. 
To illustrate our theoretical analysis, our empirical presentation focuses upon the case of 
Green (see Table 3, Column 3, for combined analysis across Cluster 2 cases).   
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In Green, managers felt opposition from the ‘old guard’; i.e., senior doctors controlling 
key departments. The latter sought to undermine the moral foundations of ICPs, emphasizing 
the risks of standardized care; and valorized the normative/moral foundations of current 
arrangements, evidencing good clinical outcomes in so doing.  
It was difficult to negotiate change with the old guard. They were skeptical that sharing 
decisions would lead to better decisions. They always argue that departments lose 
responsibilities and become less effective. At this point there is little we could do to move 
forward. (Green, Quality Manager)  
At Green, two events produced micro-institutional affordances. First, the retirement of 
several key players in the ‘old guard’ weakened opposition to service redesign. The new 
‘young guns’ looked forward to integrated care as an opportunity to improve effectiveness of 
care and at the same time, their own legitimacy.  
The new generation of doctors has very different training, sometimes from other hospitals. 
They saw ICPs and protocols with less blood in their eyes… Plus, they were filling big shoes, 
so they were eager to put their names on some important changes. (Green, Quality Manager) 
Second, managers in Green initiated a major hospital redesign whereby space was opened 
up and clinical departments co-located. The “restructuring of the walls” (Green, Quality 
Manager) was appreciated by clinical departments since the previous geographical dispersion 
had the downside of “too much isolation” (Green, Doctor). Professionals agreed that “it was a 
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” (Green, Doctor) to improve clinical services and inter-
departmental relationships. In response to this, professionals liaised with managers during the 
hospital reconfiguration to understand how they could revise their services. In doing so, they 
showed managers that they had become more tolerant of process re-engineering approaches. 
We reached breaking point, so we welcomed the relocation plans. We had to drive to any 
meeting. It became unbearable with our schedule. At that point, we had to change something 
in our services, so we asked for help from managers (Green, Doctor). 
Managers in Green became conscious that pressures to preserve the status quo had 
weakened. They did not pursue institutional work to revise established regulations, norms and 
cultural frameworks. Rather, they identified professional groups interested in ICP 
development, and supported them through a centralized project management approach. 
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Specifically: (i) middle managers identified clinical groups open to service redesign and 
championed these to executive managers to initiate local projects; (ii) executive managers 
ratified projects, assigning to middle managers the task of supporting professionals without 
interfering in their clinical decision-making; (iii) middle managers liaised with professionals 
and were allowed to participate in their multidisciplinary project teamwork as part of the 
“supporting, not supervising cast” (Green, Quality Manager), with middle managers 
engaging in extensive administrative work that legitimized their role. Finally, professionals, 
when assured that managers would not intrude upon clinical and operational decisions, 
undertook the necessary expert work for ICP development.  
We won over doctors with our backstage work around documentation, organizing meetings, 
collecting data. Doctors appreciated our efforts and told us they were glad to participate 
because time was well spent, meetings were organized and our data collection enabled them 
to focus on teamwork. (Green, Quality Manager). 
When supported by professionals, middle managers suggested the adoption of ICP formats 
and co-produced an in-house ICP methodology. Guided by this, professionals collected 
evidence to inform their decision-making, and produced illustrations of their ICP experiences 
for others to read. The extent to which ICP development informed radical service innovation 
was however questionable since professionals (i) interpreted ICP development only as a 
research or experimental endeavor, without altering their practices; (ii) replicated their 
compartmentalized decision-making in teams and hence produced ICPs which reinforced 
established boundaries, and produced only incremental innovation; (iii) developed radical 
innovation only in relatively ‘marginal’ services with few patients and resources. As a 
consequence, at Green, there was a need for sustained administrative work by quality 
managers, which cast doubt on the long-term future of ICP development. 
Nothing would work if I never show up. As soon as doctors sense weakness we are dead. But 
we are also proving to be reliable, so now they are calling us. We are proud of this, but also 
very exhausted. We wish for the next years to loosen our grip.  (Green, Quality Manager) 
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In summary, at Green, as with other cases in this cluster (see Table 3, Column 3), an 
absence of institutional work by managers left aspirations for sustaining any radical 
innovation unfulfilled. In Cluster 3 cases, detailed below, institutional work by managers was 
evident, but ineffective compared to the efforts of professionals, as detailed below. 
Cluster 3: Organizing for radical innovation through political work  
The Cluster 3 cases (Raffi and Dragan) experienced multiplicity and ambiguity of 
institutionalized interests that stimulated tolerance towards practice/boundary revision. The 
increasing promotion of multidisciplinary work from practice communities to which doctors 
were strongly attached, and growing interest of doctors in becoming ‘clinical leaders’ and 
‘first movers’ in the field breached the stabilizing effects of institutional interests toward 
compartmentalized care. Hospital managers sought to exploit the receptive context with a 
strategy that could achieve quick results in terms of ICP development, without intruding upon 
clinicians’ jurisdiction. Executives and quality managers both recognized they lacked 
expertise and clinical authority to demand use of ICP methods to redesign clinical services. 
Thus they did not venture into any technical work that openly criticized institutionalized 
values and beliefs around compartmentalized care; or any cultural work that promoted 
attachment to integrated care. To encourage the redesign of services, executives, with the 
help of quality managers, then designed and implemented a new regime of incentives for 
multidisciplinary groups organizing their work through ICP methodologies. This was a soft 
strategy of political work. On the one hand, it gave more opportunities and incentives for 
multidisciplinary groups to emerge and reorganize their services. On the other hand, the new 
regulations were not rule systems that demanded radical innovation and sanctioned non-
compliance.  
At Raffi, executive and quality managers liaised to perform political work, without 
interacting with ‘early adopters’. First, they constructed new identities; i.e. introduced a new 
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regulation that formalized the existence of ICP groups in the organizational structure. Second, 
they defined their status; i.e. developed membership rules that clinical departments had to 
follow to obtain mandated status. Third, they vested these new entities with ad-hoc financial 
resources. Professionals interpreted such initiatives as managerial intrusion and circumvented 
strategic intent by developing ICPs that reaffirmed pre-existing clinical services. 
We had those rules in place for a year, but then removed them. Directors received quite 
vicious reactions from clinical leads, who argued that the rules rewarded departments for 
principles that had nothing to do with the actual needs or effectiveness of their work. We 
received a few “ICPs” [with visible quoting gestures], which basically were internal 
protocols patched together (Raffi, Quality Manager). 
At Dragan, quality managers sought to build momentum from one very successful ICP 
experience and stimulate a wider spread of the practice. They liaised with executives and 
engaged with political work, outlining an experimental regulatory regime that promised 
recognition and resources to professional groups providing evidence of multidisciplinary 
configurations of care delivery; i.e. defining and vesting new identities. They insisted that the 
‘early adopting’ group not only promoted their ICP, but performed theorizing work with 
organizational wide programs meant to institutionalize beliefs that ICPs produce superior 
outcomes; and educating work with programs meant to provide peers with the skills and 
knowledge required for ICPs. Early adopters, however, promoted their experiences only 
temporarily and locally. They feared that further efforts would be perceived as ‘intrusion’ by 
other clinical departments. Managers’ reliance on political work in isolation from 
professionals again failed to yield the expected results. Most departments avoided ICP 
development to preserve their services, while a few pilot groups failed to develop into 
functioning multidisciplinary teams, because of their inexperience with ICPs.  
Managers invited us to make a hospital-wide effort to promote our model across 
departments. It was incompatible with our core duties; managing so many interactions with 
other departments was killing our own development. Plus, many kept us at arms’ length when 
we needed to push things. That was not worth the risk. (Dragan, Doctor) 
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In both cases, the new regulations encountered negative reactions from professionals. The 
regulations were generated with limited interaction with professionals. Managerial efforts 
were perceived as unexpected “‘changes of pace” (Dragan, Doctor). Furthermore, the 
allocation of additional resources to ICP development struck doctors as inappropriate, 
considering how regular practice was suffering from a shortage of resources. Hence, doctors 
worked to divert the extra resources towards more traditional uses. They enacted forms of 
technical work and cultural work to reinforce the centrality of professionals as priority-
setters, and emphasize best practices linked with more traditional, compartmentalized forms 
of care. These professionals reinforced the identities of the heads of clinical departments as 
central strategy-makers. Then, they reinforced the normative foundations of the existing best 
practices, highlighting how they were generated by doctors’ professionalism and by resources 
that required buffering against any diminution. In doing so, they mythologized these 
normative foundations, by using positive and negative experiences of care to highlight the 
importance of these factors, and to generate emotional attachment to them. At no point were 
ICP methods, multidisciplinary work practices, or integrated care innovations, demonized or 
deterred. In their attempt to change resource allocation, doctors engaged in political work, 
particularly in forms of advocacy work. Using meetings and face-to-face conversations, 
temporary ‘alliances’ of doctors sought to gain the support of executives. This was 
successful. Executives recognized organizational risks associated with the regulatory regime 
around ICPs. By prioritizing other goals, the stimulus to redesign care services through ICP 
methods died down, and was left to the spontaneous initiative of clinical departments.  
The regulation regime for ICPs was designed to avoid any imposition upon clinical 
departments. The new budgeting rule was optional, and not following it would not have 
repercussions on their practice… They argued, however, that it did have repercussions. They 
said: “the policymakers are cutting our funds, reimbursement money is delayed, and we need 
to pay attention to every penny… and you redistribute pockets of resources for ICPs? There 
are areas that need that money more urgently!” (Raffi, Quality Manager). 
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In summary, in Cluster 3 cases, managers engaged in institutional work, but this was 
decoupled from professional practice. Professionals also engaged in institutional work, the 
effect of which was to halt the advance of ICP methodologies, and radical innovation. Only 
in Cluster 4 cases, detailed below, is radical innovation realized.    
Cluster 4: Organizing for radical innovation through two-step institutional work  
In contrast to Cluster 3 cases, managers within Martin and Cicero developed a more 
comprehensive strategy of institutional work around radical innovation, working closely with 
professionals. Martin and Cicero experienced a multiplicity of institutional elements that, 
similarly to Cluster 3 cases, stimulated tolerance towards practice and boundary revision. The 
preservation of professionalism across clinical departments was countered by institutional 
forces oriented to the preservation of hospitals’ status as ‘clinical leaders’ and ‘first movers’ 
in the field. The multiplicity of institutional demands was such that doctors were inclined to 
seek opportunities of innovation within the boundaries of their professionalism.  
I came here five years ago and it was ‘night and day’, compared to my previous 
experiences. The mantra here is: you cannot be only a doctor, but also an innovator. 
So we need to prove that we have our own ‘field’ of action and that we constantly stay 
on its innovation frontier. (Cicero, Doctor) 
This strategy was organized in two steps: (i) initiatives that institutionalized new interests, 
norms and beliefs, allowing professionals to experiment with multidisciplinary working and 
standardized care; (ii) initiatives that reinforced institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs, 
orienting the professionals’ agency towards ICP development. Hereafter, the Cicero case is 
presented in detail.  
In the first step, executives did not enact any political work; e.g. linking ICP development 
to special status or resources for professionals, after failed attempts in the past.  
We experimented with new rules and top-down directives. We received adverse feedback from 
clinical departments lamenting that this was an unexpected change of pace and that existing 
clinical outcomes before our intervention were of high quality, and that therefore the change 
of pace was unwelcome. (Cicero, Executive Manager) 
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Rather, quality managers liaised with early adopters (i.e. doctors with reported interest in 
integrated care) to stimulate early experiments with integrated care services. Early adopting 
doctors took the lead, performing technical work to introduce institutionalized norms and 
beliefs related to interdisciplinary and standardized care. These doctors exploited earlier 
efforts at Cicero to design normative networks that facilitated interaction and mutual 
influence among elite doctors, whose offices were all located in the same physical area. This 
had engendered a habit amongst these doctors to informally share stories about each other’s 
work and patients. Professionals could also count on ‘Cicero Learning’, an organizationally 
mandated training framework through which doctors regularly interacted. Cicero Learning 
became salient for the first step of institutional work. Doctors constantly interacted with 
Cicero Learning through sending requests to organize seminars or courses that an advisory 
board reviewed. They competed considerably for places as ‘trainers’ in Cicero Learning 
because “these credits count” (Cicero, Doctor) for organizational prestige and career 
progression. Furthermore, Cicero Learning had a reputation that attracted doctors to 
participate as attendees. So, early adopters liaised with managers to take over responsibility 
for popular training programs where they performed educating work; i.e. informing and 
training fellow professionals about skills and knowledge needed to integrate professional 
boundaries and practices. They also engaged in theorizing work to explain through cause-
effect chains why new boundary and practice arrangements benefited professional work; and 
in mimicry to associate new institutionalized interests and beliefs with international best 
practices. Early adopters thus inspired their colleagues with new ideas “to stay at the frontier 
of innovation” (Cicero, Doctor) and made integrated care consistent with the cognitive 
framework into which professionals were socialized. Executives had a hands-off approach 
throughout this first stage, supporting the infrastructure and programs within which the early 
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adopters performed their technical and cultural work. Quality managers provided 
administrative support necessary for the continued engagement of doctors. 
We have programs aimed at encouraging excellence in medicine through international 
experiences. We’ve had a few doctors promoting evidence-based medicine. They sent very 
clear messages that, if we wanted to be amongst the best, most innovative organizations, we 
had to embrace this change. (Cicero, Executive Manager) 
These efforts promoted multidisciplinary working across pre-existing professional 
boundaries and practice, but did not explicitly demand service redesign. Clinical departments 
were free to experiment with integrated configurations and process reengineering. According 
to professionals’ individual preferences, this experimentation stage resulted in the 
proliferation of alternative ways of working. Most were incremental service innovations; e.g. 
creating research and evaluation groups, establishing regular multidisciplinary meetings to 
discuss patient cases, revising internal protocols to clarify connections with other clinical 
departments. More rarely, professional groups introduced radical service redesign. 
Departments were very receptive. All clinical departments have been doing something to 
manage processes, improve quality and collaborate with others. They played with the new 
concepts a lot and most departments began showing in Cicero Learning their own 
experiences, constantly remarking how they came from cross-departmental collaborations 
and were academically robust. (Cicero, Quality Manager) 
The proliferation of experiments across clinical departments signaled increasing erosion of 
boundaries and the institutionalization of interests, norms and beliefs related to 
multidisciplinary care. This experimental stage was “long and slow” (Cicero, Executive 
Manager). As noted by an executive manager in Martin: 
It is like planting season. It takes time and luck. You plant your seeds, and pray to God that 
the soil is fertile and that no flood or storm will ruin the harvest. And you wait. You patiently 
wait for the seeds to grow because you cannot really force the soil to produce results 
immediately. (Martin, Executive Manager) 
In Cicero, managers had “prepared the soil” over the years and could use structures (such 
as Cicero Learning) created and developed over decades of constant revision. In this respect, 
“time was a gentleman” (Cicero, Quality Manager) because it had allowed professionals to 
develop their own understanding of and response to integrated care.  
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On the downside, the experimental stage had produced very different results, since 
professional groups pursued their individual interests and understandings of integrated care. 
Only few radical innovations were pursued and the coalition felt the need to more 
systematically organize service innovation. 
We couldn’t find one single product that all groups produced. ICPs seemed a particularly 
smooth way to organize work but they were rare and were so different from each other. We 
wanted to channel these efforts in a more systematic way. (Cicero, Quality Manager) 
Consequently, a second and faster step of institutional work was enacted to consolidate the 
nascent interests, norms and beliefs, and orient the professionals toward service redesign in a 
more sustained way. Three forms of institutional work were enacted in 12 months. First, 
quality managers, executive managers and early adopters formed a stable coalition focused 
on organizing service redesign. This required making the coalition visible to clinical 
departments, and putting all its members in condition to perform other forms of institutional 
work. Quality managers, earlier legitimized as go-to-guys for administrative support during 
multidisciplinary experiments, led this effort, working to construct a new identity for the 
coalition; e.g. Group for Multidisciplinary Care (GMC); which was then defined and vested 
through ad-hoc rule systems defining the boundaries of its membership and conferring status 
and resources to its members. Quality managers outlined key objectives, responsibilities and 
operations of GMC, then amended by professionals and ratified by executive managers. 
Executive managers were sympathetic to our involvement. Their support was crucial because 
we have good eyes and ears, but our voice is weak, so we need to sing in a chorus. We 
interacted with doctors clearly interested in ICPs and pulled them into a stable group, 
agreeing to meet every month specifically for ICP development. We officially promoted our 
existence to clinical departments through Cicero Learning and emails, saying: “The Group 
for Multidisciplinary Care can support you: it has these people and resources, can give this 
support, you can interact with us in this way” (Cicero, Quality Manager) 
The definition and vestment of the new group primed enabling work. Quality managers 
were equipped with a dedicated budget and work allocation to become the first interface with 
clinical departments. Quality managers shaped their engagement in ways that did not crowd 
out the engagement of the professionals.  
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Doctors are the ones asking me to help; otherwise they can do it on their own. We had one 
simple rule: tell us who produces what and show us the results. We don’t want to give the 
idea we are intruding, but also that we would do all the background work. There is a fine line 
between being important and being indispensable. (Cicero, Quality Manager) 
Second, the coalition reiterated their earlier effort towards theorizing and educating work. 
The adoption of ICP formats was regarded as the most valued experience emerging from 
earlier experiments. Within Cicero Learning, quality managers and professionals co-produced 
training programs promoting ICP experiences. The increasing pool of experiences promoted 
the idea that ICPs did not endanger core jurisdictions, but actually improved clinical 
effectiveness. Theorizing and educating were pervasive as quality managers and early 
adopters used newsletters, intranets and notice-boards “to create a vibe” (Cicero, Quality 
Manager) about ICP development.  
Third, the coalition constructed new identities and normative structures through the 
institution of “Care Centers” that included all specialties involved in the management of 
specific patient groups. Executive managers outlined the general mission and scope of Care 
Centers, while early adopting doctors and quality managers developed their clinical and 
organizational specificities, which executive managers ratified and to which they assigned 
specific resources. Care Centers represented an intensive form of political work, reshaping 
[doctors’] identity (starting from their job description), the horizontal and vertical 
relationship between doctors, and access to resources. Executives also constructed new 
identities for the quality managers, embedded in the Care Centers as ICP coordinators. They 
were assigned the formal responsibility to supervise the redesign of clinical services through 
ICP methodologies. Executives vested the new identity with resources; e.g., adding assistants 
and financial resources, and reducing requests for other tasks. Care Centers were 
encompassed in a matrix-like organization in which doctors had to balance the interests of 
their own clinical departments (autonomously manage resources/expertise for multiple 
pathologies) with that of their Care Center (share the management of resources/expertise with 
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peers for a specific patient group). Care Centers were supported by mimicry work: i.e. the 
(expanding) coalition promoted their development and maintenance consistently with 
international benchmarks, and through theorizing and educating work, positive results were 
promoted as soon as they emerged. Appealing to the institutionalized interests oriented 
towards innovation leadership, doctors quickly attached themselves to existing Care Centers 
or created new ones. 
In the early stages, we spent time warming up clinical departments, after which many multi-
disciplinary ideas emerged. The time seemed ripe to formalize all this work. We developed 
Care Centers, which are organizational constructs aggregating units from a patient-centered 
perspective. They began with Cancer Centers, which is an area where medicine is already 
multidisciplinary and then we created others across the organization. (Cicero, Doctor) 
Care Centers became a natural “basket” for ICP development. The coalition of actors built 
upon professionals’ increasing attachment to Care Centers and their interest in innovation 
leadership to emphasize new normative associations; i.e. emphasizing Care Centers require 
radical innovation and ICPs represented appropriate ways to pursue this, and perform 
policing work, i.e., introduce auditing/monitoring mechanisms performed by doctors to 
ensure compliance with evidence-based guidelines in Care Centers.   
Many doctors were already familiar with ICPs so we didn’t need to tell them they were 
important. We needed to make them happen here and now. It was made clear that it was 
pointless to have Care Centers without service changes. We produced recommendations on 
“translating the mission of patient-centered services into practice”; while Care Center 
Coordinators managed requests about ICPs - de facto putting ICPs at the top of their 
priorities. (Cicero, Quality Manager)  
To guarantee the sustainability of Care Centers, middle managers enacted the embedding 
work needed to preserve professionals’ continued engagement and a constant flow of 
resources for new work and personnel. They followed many “small little things” (Cicero, 
Quality Manager) that professionals were less attuned to managing; e.g., schedules, amending 
communication systems, following developments of research proposals for additional grants.  
Discussion 
In the face of potential professional resistance, the study reveals four strategies used by 
managers to organize their expert workforce for radical innovation. Three were relatively 
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ineffective; i.e. allow full autonomy to professionals (Cluster 1); use centralized project 
management (Cluster 2); enact persuasive institutional work through extrinsic motivators 
(Cluster 3). The fourth was however effective; i.e. a cross-level and two-step strategy of 
institutional work (Cluster 4 cases). Henceforth, the four strategies are compared, following 
which a theoretical model of institutional work for radical innovation in professional 
organizations is outlined (Table 3). 
<<Table 3 about here>> 
Discussion will focus upon Cluster 3 and 4 cases, to compare institutional work strategies for 
successful realization of radical innovation. In both Clusters the stabilizing effects of 
institutional influences around professionalism were softened by new institutionalized 
interests, norms and values, around clinical innovation leadership and first-mover advantage. 
The multiplicity, heterogeneity and/or ambiguity of interests, norms and values stimulated a 
tolerance for boundary/practice revisions. These micro-institutional affordances were 
perceived by executives, quality managers, and reforming doctors as an opportunity for 
radical innovation. Executives and quality managers in Cluster 3 cases performed ‘political 
work’ (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006), using incentives to make professionals prioritize the 
radical innovation. In Raffi and Dragan, however, this achieved sub-optimal outcomes 
because the new regulations and incentives intruded upon professionals’ jurisdiction. Quality 
managers’ hands-off approach to project management added ambiguity to their request for 
radical innovation. Professionals were engaged by (but not in) the political work, did not 
understand managers’ motives for change, and were unprepared for integrated care, so their 
response was to ‘shut down’ their early tolerance and protect established boundaries and 
practices. Professional groups that adopted ICP-based methodologies did so in ways that 
legitimized only incremental innovation, or even reaffirmed the status quo. The political work 
enacted by executives and quality managers created ambiguity around adoption of ICP 
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methods. So, professional groups used ICP methods as the end point to legitimize decisions 
that had already been made locally. Overall, the institutional work in Cluster 3 decoupled 
managers from doctors, since the former developed new regulations that pushed for ICPs 
without following up their implementation in practice; while the latter had exclusive 
jurisdiction regarding interpretation of the new regulations without having shaped their 
content. In essence, executive and quality managers attempted to channel professional 
responses toward an established (and ultimately exogenous) ICP standard. In doing so, these 
cases had worse outcomes than Cluster 2 cases. In Cluster 2, the lack of cultural and technical 
work was such that the radical innovation was not at the top of professional priorities. 
However, quality managers’ practical support stimulated professionals to, at least, experiment 
with new boundaries and practices. Furthermore, Cluster 3 cases also achieved worse 
outcomes than Cluster 1 cases because the professionals’ rejection of new regulations and 
incentives created tension with managers.  
In contrast, two-step institutional work within Cluster 4 cases proved effective (see Figure 
1). In Cluster 4, institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs of professionalism mingled with 
interests to gain first mover advantage, and through innovation leadership to advance 
organizational and individual prestige. This multiplicity and heterogeneity of institutionalized 
interests generated micro-institutional affordances that stimulated more tolerance for ICP-
related experiments.  
In the first step within Cluster 4, with the support of quality managers, early adopting 
doctors led technical/cultural work to increase attachment of professional peers to integrated 
care; executives led political work to create a favorable regulative and structural context for 
local experiments. With more diluted boundaries, the second step of institutional work 
consolidated the notion that ICP methods should inform radical service redesigns. Executives 
and quality managers developed coalitions with doctors that exerted hierarchical and 
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professional authority over the latter’s peers. Thus, institutional work was not directed by 
executives and quality managers towards professionals, but by a cross-level coalition of 
‘reformers’ towards ‘defenders’ in clinical departments. This institutional work was 
internally coherent because executives, quality managers and ‘reforming’ professionals 
operated a division of labor according to their interests and influence. So, doctors controlled 
the technical and cultural work that related to their expert knowledge about clinical 
effectiveness and risk; executives controlled the political work that related to their control of 
resources; quality managers mediated the two interests, supporting each form of institutional 
work with their technical knowledge and intermediate position. The coalition timed its 
political work so it occurred after the establishment of the normative/cognitive foundations 
for change, and avoided conflict between institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs. The 
experiments in Cluster 4 were then different from those in Cluster 2. With the latter, no 
institutional work challenged normative and cultural pillars rewarding professional autonomy 
and protected jurisdiction. So, quality managers’ clerical work generated numerous service 
redesigns, but very few were radical innovations. In contrast, within Cluster 4, ICP methods 
gradually revised normative and cultural pillars, and institutional work of ‘reformers’ meant 
radical practice and boundary revisions were consolidated technically, culturally and 
regulatively. 
The two-step approach was crucial to organize professionals for radical innovation. The 
initial technical/cultural work prepared the ground by emphasizing existing norms/beliefs 
about innovation leadership and professional prestige. Executives and quality managers 
worked institutionally to emphasize multiplicity of institutional demands (Van Dijk et al., 
2011), reaching a point where professionals perceived the need to find ways to balance these. 
Professionals were allowed to ‘inhabit’ (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006) the new 
institutionalized arrangements, experiment with alternative ways of working and reflect upon 
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whether eroded boundaries challenged their core jurisdiction. Only when doctors became 
attached to multidisciplinary arrangements as a device to achieve innovation leadership, 
prestige and clinical effectiveness did the time become ripe for political work. This second 
stage of political work was characterized by: (i) a different type of political work that 
funneled the professionals’ wide-ranging experiments towards ICP development, and (ii) 
political work that consolidated ICP development and linked it with service redesign. While 
in the previous stage, the technical/cultural work operated in continuity with the past, using 
the same infrastructures (e.g., Cicero Learning) and nested institutional work within pre-
existing institutional pillars; now it was possible to develop new structures (e.g., Care Centers 
at Cicero) and regulations that established status and resources for those pursuing ICPs.  
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
Theoretical implications 
Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual model of institutional work enacted in the professional 
organizations to support radical innovation. Institutional work overcame reluctance of 
powerful professionals to operate in a collaborative environment; e.g. share decision-making. 
This reveals a scenario – relevant and yet underestimated in more ‘traditional’ firms – in 
which managers cannot really grant autonomy to professionals (who already self-regulate and 
control their operations), and cannot fully rely on incentives since these may not align with 
existing practice. The cases reveal that innovation was informed by more profound 
transformation in institutionalized interests, values and beliefs that have consolidated over the 
years. Attempts to grant “additional” autonomy or incentives without a proper revision of 
these institutional pillars are likely to produce inconsistent results. Building upon this general 
finding, the study provides three specific insights to extant literature on radical innovation. 
First, the institutional work perspective details the nature of defenders’ resistance to 
radical innovation. Most models of change emphasize how the first action for ‘reformers’ is 
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to ‘unfreeze’ (Lewin, 1951) the organization from the status quo. Regulations, social norms, 
culture and cognitive frameworks are highlighted as relevant contingencies that make an 
organization unwilling or incapable of advancing radical innovation (Buchanan et al., 2005; 
Paton and McCalman, 2008). Institutional theory suggests that these represent the basis of 
legitimacy, coercion and compliance that inhibit the ‘free’ agency of embedded actors, such 
as managers and professionals (Scott, 2001). The institutional work perspective adds a further 
insight; i.e. it shows how embedded actors do not just comply with the institutional pressures, 
but actively work to maintain the status quo. Our study shows how ‘defenders’ do not resist 
the radical change per se (e.g., several professionals were indeed positive that integrated care 
was a worthwhile idea), but the implications that the change would have on institutionalized 
interests (e.g., changes to reimbursement mechanisms), norms (e.g., changes in jurisdictions 
and autonomy) and values (e.g., changes to effectiveness and risks around care). Hence, the 
‘institutional work’ perspective can enumerate the tactics through which ‘defenders’ resist 
innovation, by “unpacking” actions that are oriented at towards reinforcement of 
institutionalized norms and cognitive frameworks (i.e., technical work), local attachment to 
these institutional pillars (i.e., cultural work), and production of incentive systems and rules 
that reward certain behaviors over others (i.e., political work). The present study thus shows 
how the ‘struggle’ between ‘reformers’ and ‘defenders’ around radical innovation is framed 
by established institutional pillars and may generate new ones. 
Second, executives, middle managers and professionals had key distinctive roles during 
the two-step institutional work. Extant research highlights radical innovation is more likely to 
succeed when cross-level ‘dominant coalitions’ are involved (Damanpour, 1991; Kotter, 
1999). The present study extends this by highlighting how the coalition might work internally 
to pursue institutional work. Professionals’ jurisdictions remained fundamentally inaccessible 
to executive and middle managers, so only professionals act as ‘institutional carriers’ of 
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normative and cultural/cognitive pillars. Furthermore, early adopters played a key role in the 
institutional work strategy as they had the expert knowledge and professional background to 
make sense of how diverse institutional elements integrate, following which they could enact 
technical and cultural work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) to shape new cognitive/normative 
foundations of change (Scott, 2001). This was effective when professionals could keep 
managers at a distance in the earlier stages of institutional work, so that boundary and 
practice revisions could be negotiated between peers. By doing so, professionals did not feel 
their institutionalized interests were threatened by managerial interests. Also, professionals’ 
technical and cultural work was particularly effective when encompassed within 
organizational structures such as Cicero Learning to which all professionals were already 
attached and in which educating and theorizing (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) was tolerated.  
In contrast, executives were involved in organizing radical innovation mostly through 
ratifying behaviors and outcomes (necessary for professionals to increase their organizational 
status) and structuring rules and regulations (necessary to obtain resources and facilities). In 
doing so, they engaged primarily with political forms of institutional work. Executives were 
unwilling to act without professional support, either leaving the responsibility for radical 
innovation entirely to professionals; or limiting themselves to co-creating structures for the 
co-option of local interests (e.g., Care Centers). They linked with high-status professionals to 
legitimize their involvement, create coherence in the face of institutional multiplicity (Van 
Dijk et al., 2011), and engage with the cognitive/normative assumptions held by professionals 
within specific clinical departments. Attempts to enact political work without professional 
links failed (cf. Raffi and Dragan). So, executive managers’ role, although crucial, depends 
on three contingencies: (i) their consciousness that micro-institutional affordances reduce risk 
that frontline professionals resent their intrusion; (ii) possibility to liaise with clearly 
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identifiable local professional groups; (iii) support of middle managers as lynchpins to 
engage with professionals at the frontline (Currie and Procter, 2005).  
Middle managers’ proximity to executives and professionals enabled them to mediate 
different interests. Hence, although they did not control any of the ‘institutional carriers’ 
affecting the regulative, normative and cognitive/cultural pillars, they were still able to enact 
an institutional role in creating and maintaining new institutional arrangements. At Cicero 
and Martin, middle managers liaised with professionals to support technical/cultural work 
(e.g., preparing and sustaining professionals’ educating and theorizing in Cicero Learning) 
and with executive managers to support political work (e.g. outlining Care Center regulations 
and carrying out administrative work, thereby increasing professional engagement with 
potential service reconfiguration) (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006).  
Third, earlier research has shown how radical innovation in professional organizations, 
requires fundamental changes in ways of working and overarching institutional arrangements. 
These changes require structured tactics of ‘small wins’ that expand the pool of supporters 
across the organization (Kotter, 1999; Reay et al., 2006). The present study emphasizes how 
‘small wins’ were carried out primarily in terms of technical and cultural work; i.e. small 
wins did not just promote ICP methodology, but drove changes in deeper rules of legitimacy 
and compliance within the organization, hence were carried out primarily by the ‘early 
adopting’ professionals along with middle managers. The model induced from the present 
study has a fundamental difference with other models of change, for which promoting ‘small 
wins’ serve the purpose of diffusing the radical innovation across the system; i.e. increase the 
number of adopters and supporters. In the present study, the first step of institutional work 
does not promote the radical innovation per se since other professionals could be 
fundamentally and legitimately indifferent to it. Rather, the ‘small win’ needed to celebrate 
the ICP methodology underpinning radical innovation, so that other professional groups 
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could use that example to develop radical innovation in their own disciplinary areas. Thus, 
‘small wins’ in the study are aimed at changing the normative and cognitive bases of 
legitimacy in the organization; i.e. validating applications of ICP methods to redesign 
services to enhance effectiveness of care and reduce clinical risk. This institutional 
perspective also explains why professionals (and particularly high-status doctors) led the 
small wins while middle managers took the back-seat. As noted earlier, only professionals 
controlled the institutional carriers connected to normative and cognitive pillars, hence their 
role in the coalition is central from the very beginning. The ‘small wins’ matured into a 
broader institutionalization of change only when the presence of professionals in the coalition 
was significant enough to drive change in normative and cognitive pillars in the organization. 
In Cicero, particularly, the second step originated when there was little doubt that clinical 
departments were engaged with integrated care and needed a “final stroke” (Cicero, Quality 
Manager). At this point, the political work enacted by executives (with middle managers and 
professionals on the back-seat) generated radical innovation. Political work consolidated 
nascent boundaries and practices; while the second stage of technical/cultural work oriented 
professionals more systematically towards ICP methods as the approach for radical 
innovation. This two-step institutional work strategy was then effective because it associated 
radical innovation with incremental institutional change processes through which managers 
emphasized an institutional dilemma (how to balance self-regulation and effectiveness with 
innovation leadership and professional prestige) and gave professionals time to make sense of 
how to integrate diverse institutional elements associated with professional organization and 
radical innovation. Radical innovation thus ceased to be incommensurate with established 
professional interests, norms and beliefs, and professionals spontaneously engaged with it.  
Managerial Implications 
 32 
This study investigated how managers organized a professionalized workforce for radical 
innovation. Our study highlighted how executive and middle managers drive radical 
innovation through developing cross-level coalitions and enacting two stages of institutional 
work. In driving radical innovation, managers drew upon the knowledge and influence of 
reforming professionals to change the vested interests, norms and logics that protected the 
status quo. 
Our study provides more ‘traditional’ firms with relevant insights into how an expert 
workforce could be organized for radical innovation through examining experts’ autonomy 
from a different perspective. Previous research commonly asked ‘how much’ autonomy 
should be granted to experts, and highlighted how it enhances their creativity. In contrast, our 
study shows what happens when autonomy is established in experts’ life, and cannot be 
‘taken back’. In such situations, managers need to organize radical innovation by adapting to 
experts’ autonomy and finding ways to challenge established interests, norms and values. Our 
study thus provides four key incations to managers on radical innovation.  
First, our study highlights how the strength of institutionalized arrangements and 
professionals’ institutional work constrained managerial actions to such an extent that 
executives would reinforce, rather than challenge, the status quo; and middle managers would 
refrain from any action when professionals perceive them as intrusive.  
Second, our study shows when managers mediate professional organization to advance 
radical innovation, particularly how managerial action is dependent upon their recognition of 
‘micro-institutional affordances’ (Van Dijk et al., 2011).  
Third, our study details the managerial actions to influence frontline professionals towards 
radical innovation. While centralizing decision-making through political work had 
considerable limits in realizing radical innovation, enacting gradual and collaborative 
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institutional work proved successful, when complemented by professional experimentation 
with new practices and boundaries.  
Fourth, our study emphasizes the importance of an institutional perspective in innovation 
management studies. Institutionalized arrangements are commonly seen to prevent radical 
boundary and practice revision. Our study highlights how managers can reconfigure 
regulative, normative and cognitive institutional pillars to enable professionals’ enactment of 
radical innovation. Arguably, these findings can be transferred to any context where 
institutional arrangements and workforce autonomy inhibit managers’ organization of radical 
innovations. Professionalization dynamics have become increasingly relevant in 
contemporary firms where professionals, such as R&D employees, scientists, designers, 
software developers, claim autonomy and self-regulation derived from the use of their unique 
knowledge and skills (Muzio et al., 2013), and use it to influence the nature and extent of 
radical innovation. 
In summary, our study suggests that managers can support the introduction of radical 
innovation by first, developing stable alliances with local professional groups to provide 
cognitive/normative foundations of radical innovation; second, allowing professionals to 
inhabit nascent institutional arrangements and to make sense of how these fit with their 
prevailing interests, norms and beliefs; third, co-developing structures/rules that encourage 
professionals to pursue radical innovation; and finally performing maintenance work that 
preserves professionals’ attachment to new institutions. Our study also emphasizes the need 
to develop systems that identify micro-institutional affordances. Middle managers appear 
particularly well positioned to do this, as they are close to frontline professionals, and so can 
relate to multiple, heterogeneous and ambiguous institutional interests held by different actors 
(Van Dijk et al., 2011).   
Limitations & Future Research 
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The study calls for more research linking institutional constructs with radical innovation 
and presents the opportunity to explore how micro-institutional affordances emerge (Van 
Dijk et al., 2011). Furthermore, previous research highlights that managers’ social position 
and other individual characteristics explain decisions made about their pursuit of strategic 
initiatives (Lockett et al., 2014; Mantere, 2008). Further research might assess in greater 
detail when and why managers tend to select strategies of institutional work to support radical 
innovation. 
Finally, we recognize limitations of our study to highlight a need for future research. First, 
our study relied methodologically on comparative case study to contrast different approaches 
to radical innovation. Comparative case studies are positioned in a grey area between the in-
depth analysis of single case studies and the statistical generalization of surveys (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Second, the results stem from a hospital setting. While the authors believe 
the analysis is generalizable to other contexts characterized by expert knowledge, further 
research to examine whether the analysis can be applied to other settings is encouraged. 
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Figure 1: Model of cross-level and two-stage strategy of institutional work for radical innovation 
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Table 1: Forms of Institutional Work 
Institutional work Definition (Adapted from Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) Examples from our dataset 
Political Work Creating, maintaining, disrupting rules, property rights and structures that define access to resources and status 
Constructing 
Identities 
Defining relationships between actors and the field in which they operate Regulation formalizing ICP groups in organizational 
structure (Raffi) or Care Centers (Cicero) 
Defining Constructing rule systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of 
membership or create status hierarchies within an organization 
Membership rules to gain status in new ICP group (Raffi) or 
Care Center (Cicero) 
Vesting Creating of rule structures that confer property rights Rights to ad-hoc financial resources to sustain ICP group 
(Raffi) or Care Center (Cicero) 
Enabling work Creating rules that facilitate, supplement and support institutions, such as 
the creation of authorizing agents or diverting resources 
Definition of Group for Multidisciplinary Care to support 
Care Centers for ICP development (Cicero) 
Policing Ensuring compliance through enforcement, auditing and monitoring Monitoring mechanisms by elite doctors to ensure 
compliance with ICP development (Cicero).   
Technical Work Creating, maintaining or disrupting beliefs, values and  social norms that define appropriate behaviors 
Changing normative 
associations 
Re-making the connections between sets of practices and normative the 
moral and cultural foundations for those practices 
Linking Care Centers with radical innovation around ICPs 
(Cicero) 
Changing normative 
networks 
Constructing connections through which practices become normatively 
sanctioned and reviewed by relevant peer group  
Panel of elite doctors responsible for ensuring compliance 
with ICP development (Cicero) 
Theorizing The development and specification of abstract categories and the elaboration 
of chains of cause and effect 
Linking Cicero Learning programmes with frameworks for 
integrated care (Cicero) 
Cultural Work Institutional work aimed at creating, maintaining or disrupting actors’ embeddedness to existing institutions 
Mimicry Associating new practices with existing sets of taken-for-granted practices, 
technologies and rules in order to ease adoption 
Development and promotion of Care Centers and Cicero 
Learning from international benchmarks (Cicero) 
Educating The educating of actors in skills and knowledge necessary to support the 
new institution 
Using Cicero Learning programmes to educate elite doctors 
on ICP development and outcomes 
Embedding and 
routinizing 
Actively infusing the normative foundations of an institution into the 
participants' day to day routines and organizational practices 
Middle managers performing administrative work to 
facilitate doctors’ engagement and constant flow of 
resources (Cicero) 
Valorizing 
(undermining) moral 
foundations 
(Dis)associating new practice, rule or technology to (from) its moral 
foundation as (in)appropriate within a specific cultural context 
‘Old guard’ linking ICPs with negative expectations about  
standardized care (Green) 
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Table 2: Study Informants and Data 
Hospital 
Type  
Beds* 
Employees* 
Cluster   Informants    Archival Data 
PHASE 1 INTERVIEWS 
CICERO  
Teaching 
800 beds 
2000 emp. 
4 
(7) Medical Director, R&D Director, Care Centre 
Assistant Manager, 4 Doctors 
Care Centre Strategy, Care Centre Meetings Minutes, 2 ICP 
Documents, 3 ICP Presentations 
MARTIN 
Generalist  
1000 beds 
2300 emp. 
4 
(8) Chief Executive, Medical Director, 2 Quality Unit 
Managers, 4 Doctors 
1 ICP Document, 1 ICP Presentation,  
Workshop Minutes, 2 Internal Strategy Documents 
GREEN 
Teaching 
1800 beds 
4500 emp. 
2 
(4) Quality Unit Manager, 2 Quality Unit Assistants, 1 
Doctor 
1 ICP ppt Presentation, 2 Scientific Articles, 1 Internal Strategy 
Document 
SLOAN 
Specialist  
250 beds 
900 emp. 
2 
(9) Medical Director, 2 Quality Unit Managers, 1 ICP 
coordinator, 5 Doctors 
6 ICP Documents, 1 ICP Presentation, 1 Internal Strategy 
Document 
TAILOR  
Teaching 
500 beds 
1200 emp. 
1 
(7) 1 Quality Unit Manager, 2 Quality Unit Assistants, 4 
Doctors 
1 Internal Strategy Document, 1 Survey, 2 Student Theses,  
WINTER 
Teaching 
800 beds 
2000 emp. 
1 (4) 2 Quality Unit Managers, 2 Doctors 2 Internal Strategy Documents 
PHASE 2 INTERVIEWS 
RAFFI 
Generalist  
2000 beds 
5000 emp. 
3 (3) Medical Director, Quality Unit Manager, 1 Doctor 1 ICP Document, 1 Internal Strategy Document 
DRAGAN 
Generalist  
1500 beds 
4000 emp. 
3 
(3) Medical Director, Quality Unit Manager, Quality 
Unit Assistant 
1 ICP Document, 1 ICP Presentation, 1 ICP Poster, 1 Internal 
Strategy Document 
WOODY 
Teaching 
800 beds 
2000 emp. 
2 (3) 1 Quality Unit Manager, 2 Doctors 2 Internal Strategy Documents, 1 Budget Document 
MANDEL 
Generalist 
1400 beds 
4000 emp. 
2 
(3) Medical Director, Quality Unit Manager, Quality 
Unit Assistant 
7 ICP Documents, 3 ICP Posters, 1 Scientific Article, 1 Internal 
Strategy Document 
SMITH 
Generalist 
500 beds 
1500 emp. 
1 
(4) Quality Unit Manager, 2 Quality Unit Assistants, 1 
Doctor 
1 ICP Document, 2 ICP ppt Presentations, Workshop Minutes, 
1 Internal Strategy Document 
BLACK 
Specialist 
800 beds 
2000 emp. 
1 (5) 1 Quality Unit Manager, 4 Doctors 2 Internal Strategy Documents  
* Numbers have been  approximated to avoid identification 
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Table 3: Comparison of Findings 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Cases Winter, Tailor, Woody, Black Sloan, Smith, Green, Mandel Raffi, Dragan Cicero, Martin 
Institutional 
Environment 
and Micro-
Institutional 
Affordances 
Interests, norms, beliefs on: 
 Self-regulation, protected 
jurisdictions, effectiveness 
(institutionalized) 
Interests, norms, beliefs on: 
 Self-regulation, protected 
jurisdictions, effectiveness 
(institutionalized) 
 Early adopting role (Sloan: rising); 
boundary experimentation (Mandel, 
Smith: local; Green: ambiguity) 
Interests, norms, beliefs on: 
 Self-regulation, protected 
jurisdictions, effectiveness 
(institutionalized) 
 Efficiency, boundary dilution, 
control (local)  
Interests, norms, beliefs on: 
 Self-regulation, protected 
jurisdictions, effectiveness 
(institutionalized) 
 Innovation leadership, prestige 
(Cicero & Martin: rising) 
Professionals’ 
Agency 
 Perform technical and cultural work 
to defend status quo, particularly 
undermining moral foundations of 
radical redesigns; and valorizing 
status quo 
 Local spontaneity outside of 
managers’ view 
 Because of greater tolerance to 
change, their institutional work 
against service redesign is weak.  
 They experiment with ICP projects 
with managers, and often promote 
their local successes 
 Local experiments do not change 
established arrangements 
 Local spontaneity outside of 
managers’ view 
 Rejected requests to theorize and 
educate ICPs 
 Reinforced Undermining moral 
foundations of ICP development; 
valorizing status quo 
 Stage 1: Early adopters educate, 
theorize, mimic boundary dilution 
 Groups experiment with practices to 
make sense of new institutions 
 Stage 2: Groups educate, theorize, 
mimic ICPs 
 Stage 2: High-status doctors 
emphasize normative associations 
and radical policy innovation 
Executive 
Managers’ 
Agency 
 Avoid any institutional work to 
avoid conflicts with professionals 
 Occasionally, pursued narratives of 
stability and risk that reinforced 
professionals’ technical/cultural 
work  
 Inhibit middle managers’ 
involvement 
 Ratification of project work 
 Prevent middle managers from 
involvement to avoid conflicts with 
and between professional groups 
 No institutional work establishing 
new rules or incentives 
 Political work (constructing, 
defining, vesting identities) to link 
status and resources to ICPs 
 Stage 1: Construct, define & vest 
identities to Quality Dept. 
 Stage 2: Construct, define & vest 
identities to Coalition + Construct 
normative networks & identities to 
ICP groups  
Middle 
Managers’ 
Agency 
 Collect/synthesize information 
up/downwards, manifesting their 
interest in change 
 Wedded to traditional roles when 
aware of executive managers’ and 
professionals’ resistance 
 Collect/synthesize information 
upwards and downwards 
 Side-by-side work in projects 
 No institutional work 
 Collect/synthesize information 
up/downwards 
 Support executive managers 
 Wedded to traditional roles 
 Collect/synthesize information 
up/downwards 
 Stage 1: Support early adopters & 
executive managers  
 Stage 2: Embed & routinize new 
networks and identities 
Outcomes 
 No or isolated ICPs 
 No radical service redesign 
 Stable relationship between 
management and professionals 
 High number of ICPs, but few 
informing radical service redesigns 
 Experiments in marginal areas 
 Heavy workload for managers 
 Sensitivity to external jolts 
 No or isolated ICPs 
 No radical service redesign 
 Temporary tensions between 
management and professionals 
 High number of ICPs, linked with 
radical service redesign 
 Feasible workload for managers 
 Radical innovation institutionalized 
in new structures 
 
